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Governance is a critical component of the effective management of a sport 
organisation.  Due to the changing nature of sport organisations, most notably the 
movement to adopt business models of operation, questions of appropriate forms of 
governance have attracted increasing research attention in the sport sector.  This paper 
reviews the governance literature in sport management, and discusses issues of board 
roles and board composition.  Four governance theories are presented to help us better 
understand how to interpret the function of board roles in sport organisations. The 
governance requirement for board of sport organisations in Taiwan is presented as an 
example of one approach to governance. We conclude by suggesting future research 
directions and the practical implications associated with board governance. 
 


























Contemporary sport organisations face an array of performance pressures from the 
public, the organisations’ members and the government.  Escalating pressures include 
increased revenue generation, attracting higher membership numbers, and the 
provision of more member services, while at the same time producing world 
champion athletes or teams. Governance is a critical component of managing a sport 
organisation since it is concerned with issues of policy and direction for the 
performance of sport organisations (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005; Hoye, 
2006; Hoye & Auld, 2001).   
 
With an appropriate governance system in place, organisational activities can be 
monitored to deliver benefits to sport organisations, members and society (Hoye, 
2006; Mason, Thibault, & Misener, 2006).  The failure to have an appropriate 
governance to control and monitor sport organisations can result in withdrawal of 
sponsorship, decline in membership numbers and participation and possible 
intervention from external agencies (UK Sport, 2004).  In a governance system, the 
board is a critical mechanism because its main responsibility is to make certain that 
the activities of the organisation are carried out in the best interests of the organisation, 
its members and society. Good corporate governacne acts to ensure that sport 
organisations are viable and effective in the present and future (Australian Sports 
Commission, 2005). However, in spite of the importance of effective governance, it 
has been acknowledged that little research has been undertaken to investigate sport 
governance (Forster, 2006; Hindley, 2003).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine current literature about sport governance and 
board governance and to identify research gaps.  To do this we briefly discuss the 
unique characteristics of sport organisations and present definitions of sport 
governance. Literature regarding sport governance with a particular emphasis on 
board governance, board roles and board composition is reviewed followed by a 
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discussion of existing models of governance. The case of Taiwanese governance is 
presented as a model of governance due to its unique characteristics in board structure.  
 
Sport organisations and definitions of sport governance 
 
Sport organisations exist to provide sport products and services in the sport industry 
(Chelladurai, 2005). Many researchers have documented the distinctive characteristics 
of sport organisations and the list is relatively consistent (Chelladurai, 2005; Slack & 
Parent, 2006; Smith & Stewart, 1999). One critical difference between sport 
organisations and business organisations is the way they measure performance (Smith 
and Stewart, 1999). The main purpose of business organisations is to make a profit. 
On the other hand, fans or members of sport organisations commonly measure 
performance on the basis of championship. Profits made by a sport organisation might 
not satisfy fans and members if it finishes a season at the bottom. While many sport 
organisations such as sporting good manufacturers and athlete management 
companies are considered as for profit organisations, the majority of sport 
organisations that provide participation opportunities and promote sport are 
categorized as nonprofit sport organisations (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). A nonprofit 
board ensures that a sport organisation conducts its mission without striving to make a 
profit and that the benefits it creates are delivered to its members or individuals it 
exists to serve (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). A volunteer board at the top of hierarchy of 
authority is the most common governance structure present in sport organisations 
(Kikulis, 2000).  
 
     While there has been no one agreed definition of sport governance, Hums and 
Maclean (2004: 5) defined sport governance as ‘the exercise of power and authority in 
sport organisations, including policy making, to determine organisational mission, 
membership, eligibility, and regulatory power, within the organisation’s appropriate 
local, national, or international scope.’ Hoye and Cuskelly (2007:9) defined sport 
governance as ‘the structure and process used by an organisation to develop its 
strategic goals and direction, monitor its performance against these goals and ensure 
that its board acts in the best interests of the members.’  
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These definitions encapsulate four concepts: power, direction, control and regulation. 
Governing sport organisations includes granting certain people within sport 
organisations power to do something they would not have otherwise done. 
Governance also includes giving sport organisations a direction or a strategy designed 
to achieve their goals. Controlling function is the third concept of sport governance. 
Activities of sport organisations should be controlled to ensure that the activities are 
congruent with organisations’ interests and that sport organisations work toward an 
agreed direction. The last concept is regulation. It involves establishing rules, 
guidelines and policies for members to follow. If necessary, sport organisations could 
impose punishment if compliance requirements are not met (Ferkins et al., 2005; 
Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Hums & Maclean, 2004; Slack & Parent, 2006).  
 
These concepts suggest that sport governance aims to ensure that the board seeks to 
deliver outcomes for the benefits of sport organisations and their members and that 
the means used to achieve these outcomes are monitored effectively (Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2007).  In a sport organisation, the board is generally granted power to 
establish or ratify strategies, monitor activities carried out to achieve strategies and 
impose punishment if members violate rules. While sport governance does not only 
concern the board, the board plays a vital role in sport organisations and defining 
sport governance. Therefore it is relevant to understand the literature on board 
governance and the findings of previous governance research in sport management.      
         
Governance research in sport management  
Extant governance research in sport management has been mainly concerned with 
governance in global sport organisations (Forster, 2006), corporate governance in 
professional sport clubs (Michie, 2000; Michie & Oughton, 2005), applying agency 
theory to sport organisations (Mason, 1997; Mason et al., 2006), and board and staff 
relationships (Hoye, 2004, 2006). Table 1 provides a summary of existing governance 
literature in sport management.   
Insert Table 1 here 
 
In research on governance problems in global sport organisations (GSOs), Forster 
(2006: 72) defined global sport organisations as ‘the supreme organs of governance in 
sport whose authority is global’.  These organisations include the International 
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Federation of Football Associations (IFFA), the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC), the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) and so forth.  
Forster (2006) argued that some of these organisations have self-governance problems.  
For example, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) was formally separated from 
the IOC in 1993/94 but the president of CAS is a vice president of IOC.  Therefore, 
there have been questions about the impartiality of CAS due to its association with the 
IOC.  There also have been a number of scandals within the IOC and FIFA 
concerning the ethical behavior of board members (Davies, 1999). 
 
The governance issues of the IOC have generated much discussion. The IOC has 
conducted several reforms in its structure and governance, such as changes to the age 
of retirement, limiting terms of IOC member to eight years subject to re-election, 
including active athletes and presidents of international federation as members.  
However, Mason et al. (2006) argued that the IOC should do more.  They suggested 
that the IOC members should have more stakeholders who have benefits from IOC, 
such as media and corporate sponsors.  Moreover, they suggest that three control 
systems should be introduced into the IOC, including decision hierarchies, mutual 
monitoring systems and a board of directors.  More importantly, management and 
control functions should be separated.  The board should be responsible for control 
functions and agents handle management functions.    
  
Hoye and Auld’s (2001) study of board performance of Australian sport organisations 
found that effective boards are better at conducting their responsibilities than 
ineffective boards, in aspects such as financial management, setting and reviewing the 
mission, conducting meetings, strategic planning, monitoring program performance, 
risk management, selecting board members, and marketing.  Hoye and Cuskelly (2003) 
also found that board-executive relationships were perceived positively by effective 
boards but less so by ineffective boards.  They asserted that mutual trust, board 
leadership, information control and responsibilities were key elements in board-
executive relationships and was related to board performance.  
 
Based on the leader-member exchange theory, Hoye (2004) found that ‘that board 
chairs and executives perceived the quality of their leader-member exchanges to be 
higher than their respective relationship with board member’ (p.55) and that the board 
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performance was positively related to the perception of higher-quality leader-member 
exchanges.  Following this, Hoye (2006) went on to explore further aspects of the 
leader-member relationship.  He found that the organisational leadership was derived 
from either board chairs or executives.  A mature working relationship was developed 
when executives supported leadership of the board chair.    
 
Researchers have used board of directors as respondents to examine issues of 
cohesion (Doherty & Carron, 2003), and perceptions of distributive justice (Mahony, 
Hums, & Riemer, 2002, 2005).  Canadian voluntary sport organisations have been 
investigated for organisational change (Amis & Slack, 1996; Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 
2004b; Auld & Godbey, 1998; Cousens, 1997; Kikulis, 2000; Kikulis, Slack, & 
Hinings, 1995; Stevens, 2006).  Auld and Godbey (1998) discussed the relationship 
between professionals and board members in the change process, such as conflicts 
over the control of decision making.  Amis and Slack (1996) examined the 
organisation’s size-structure relationship when organisations were engaged in the 
change process.  The latter study also found that most decisions were made by board 
members and did not decentralize to the professionals.  Table 2 summarizes the 
research partially focusing on governance in sport organisations.   
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Within the growing governance literature in sport management there has been 
increasing attention on board governance due to the importance of boards in the 
decision making and strategic direction of organisations.  Additionally, many 
countries have introduced legislation and policies governing the composition of 
boards, and funding bodies have started to tie monies distributed to sport 
organisations to aspects concerning board composition.  The next sections will discuss 
board governance, particularly board composition and board roles. 
   
Board Roles 
Board roles vary according to industry and organisational type, including profit 
organisations, (Blair, 1995; Clarkson, 1995; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Huse, 2005; 
Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), nonprofit 
organisations (Cadbury, 2002; Carver, 1997; Houle, 1989; Pointer & Orlikoff, 2002) 
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and sport organisations (The Australian Sports Commission, 2005). Table 3 exhibits 
the range of these differences. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Empirical investigations of what board members actually do in their sport 
organisations (Inglis, 1997;Shilbury, 2001) is rather sparse.  Inglis (1997) surveyed 
executive directors, board presidents and board members of Canadian Provincial 
Sport Organisations to empirically investigate the board roles and found that board 
roles include four factors and 16 items. These were: Mission—ethical responsibilities, 
following charters, and keeping policies in line with mission; Planning—financial 
policy, budget allocations, human resources and long-range plans and strategies; 
Executive Director—hiring and monitoring of the executive directors as well as 
concern for fulfilling legal responsibilities; and Community Relations—developing 
and delivering specific programs and services, representing the interest of certain 
groups, raising funds, and promoting advocacy and community relations.  A 
significant difference in the perception of importance and performance for the board 
roles between paid staff and board members and male and female members was found 
and Inglis (1997:174) suggested, ‘understanding additional explanations for varying 
perceptions of the roles by gender should be a focus for further research.’  
 
Miller-Millesen (2003) asserted that while there are different governance theories 
regarding board roles, there is no grand governance theory covering all board roles 
because each governance theory focuses on different roles of board members.  He 
posited that theoretical origins of the best practice of board roles come from agency 
theory, resource dependence theory and institutional theory.   
 
Agency theory 
Agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) can be used to 
frame the relationship between CEOs/managers (agents) and owners (principals). 
From this perspective the board is a mechanism to monitor managerial behavior and 
to assure that managerial activities are aligned with the principals’ interests (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Rhoades et al., 2000).  The board of directors should control 
CEOs/managers and ensure that their organisation engages in activities that are 
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congruent with community expectations (Clarke, 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Gibelman, Gelman, & Pollack, 1997; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Rhoades et al., 2000).  
The board roles, therefore, include hiring, replacing, monitoring, assessing and 
compensating CEOs/managers, developing missions, approving and evaluating 
programs/services, allocating resources, managing finance, as well as ratifying major 
strategies/decisions made by management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fligstein & 
Freeland, 1995; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Miller-Millesen, 2003).  The concept of 
owners is not directly relevant to many nonprofit sport organsations. Mason et al. 
(2006) argued that “principals” in nonprofit sport organisations are the parties that 
receive the benefits of the achievements. This could be the organisation itself and 
multiple stakeholders, such as members, clients, governments, volunteers, society and 
sponsors.  In this schema the agents are the paid staff responsible for the 
organisation’s operation.  The board of directors is the mechanism to ensure that paid 
staff behaves in a manner that befits the interests of multiple stakeholders.   
 
While agency theory addresses the monitoring and controlling role of a board it has 
limitations.  Firstly, agency theory is a simplified model.  It assumes there are only 
two main participants—the principal and the agent—in organisations (Daily, Dalton, 
& Cannella, 2003).  In reality, organisations are comprised of more than two members.  
A board interacts with organisational members other than just CEOs/managers, such 
as providing consultation to other members.  Secondly, it is likely that when 
CEOs/managers serve an owners’ interests, their interests are satisfied at the same 
time (Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998).  Therefore, the board may not only monitor 
CEOs/managers but also assist CEOs/managers to achieve organisational goals.  
Thirdly, to protect their careers and reputation in the managerial market, 
CEOs/managers are likely to behave in a manner aligned with the owners’ interests 
(Kosnik, 1987).  In this situation, the board may pay less attention to monitoring 
CEOs/managers.  An additional limitation of agency theory is that organisations 
operate in an open system, and they influence and are influenced by the external 
environment in which they operate (Chelladurai, 2005).  However, agency theory 
assumes that board effectiveness is only associated with good monitoring functions.  
Therefore, researchers have used resource dependency theory, institutional theory and 




Resource dependency theory 
Resource dependency theory states that organisational survival is based on 
organisational capabilities to acquire and maintain resources essential to the 
organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In resource dependence theory the board of 
directors serve as a mechanism connecting their organisations with external resources 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Miller-Millesen, 2003).  The duties of directors 
are to reduce external uncertainty, access needed information, bring resources and 
represent the organisations (Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Hillman et al., 2000; 
Lynall et al., 2003; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Miller-Millesen, 2003).  Resource 
dependency theory is mainly used to explain the roles of nonprofit board (Miller-
Millesen, 2003).  When organisations are in a stable environment, the board is less 
likely to engage in helping organisations access to external resources in this case, the 
board may primarily engage in administrative functions (Miller-Millesen, 2003). 
 
Institutional theory 
In complement, institutional theory emphasizes the importance of normative structure 
and rules in guiding and constraining organisational behaviors (Lynall et al., 2003; 
Miller-Millesen, 2003).   The main concept behind the institutional theory is that a 
particular pattern of doing things evolves over time and becomes legitimated.  The 
organisation changes structure, processes or behaviors to meet normative or moral 
requirements (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Pfeffer, 1982).  As such, if boards have 
similar roles, it is the result that these roles have become accepted ways or have been 
a result of coercion (Miller-Millesen, 2003).  Board roles in institutional theory 
include attending meetings, adhering to related laws/regulations, filing required 
documents, insisting on sound financial management tools and avoiding conflict-of-
interests situations (Ingram, 2003; Miller-Millesen, 2003).  Through coercive, 
mimetic or normative processes, organisations of the same type will gradually become 
similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Organisational practices are also able to be 
predicted by reviewing organisational history or industry traditions (Eisenhardt, 1988).   
 
Institutional theory does not fully explain why and how organisations are likely to 
resist change.  Resistance come from the opposition of interest groups, high cost of 
change or lack of understanding of change (Slack & Parent, 2006).  In this situation, 
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the board may have to enter into negotiation with members in order to accept change 
or develop alternative strategies to replace the change.  For some types of 
organisations, such as nonprofit national sport organisations, failure to comply with 
institutional expectations may result in, for example, the loss of government subsidies.  
Therefore, the government may force nonprofit national sport organisations to accept 
change even though they may be psychologically resistant.  In this situation, it is 
likely that compliance is just symbolic so that the institutional force has little impact 
on the organisation (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Stone, Bigelow, & Crittenden, 1999).  




Stakeholder theory can also be used to better understand the board roles in sport 
organisations. Stakeholder theory contends that the organisation should govern the 
relationship with various stakeholders (Clarke, 2004).  For profit sport organisations, 
stakeholders include shareholders, employees, members, and supplies.  For nonprofit 
sport organisations, there are many stakeholders and these can include sponsors, 
funding bodies, staff, general public, communities, and government (Australian 
Sports Commission, 2005).  Organisations can serve a wide range of social purposes 
and create value for its stakeholders (Blair, 1995; Clarke, 1998; Clarkson, 1995).  Due 
to these multiple stakeholders, organisations have to balance the interests of various 
stakeholders and the primary board role is to identify, understand and satisfy the 
needs of stakeholders (Carver, 1997).  However, shareholders/owners own equity, and 
have rights to manage and control organisations and the board may be asked by 
shareholders/owners to perform tasks that do not necessarily meet stakeholders’ 
interests.  The board may spend much of its time on communicating, negotiating or 
develop multiple programs for various stakeholders. 
 
Each theory explained above has been based on corporate governance rather than on 
sport governance. While research on sport governance has been increasing, there have 
been a few empirical studied that focused on board roles in sport organisations (Inglis, 
1997; Shilbury, 2001). Among the few studies, no theoretical frameworks were 
applied. The above theories offer a foundation for sport governance. Sport researchers 
can examine whether these theories can be transferred from corporate governance.  
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Moreover, researchers have argued that no single theory can fully explain the range of 
board roles and responsibilities.  Thus it seems that a multi-theoretic approach will 




Does size matter? 
There are a number of propositions about the optimum size of a board. Agency theory 
suggests that board members are selected to manage relationships between the board 
and the manager and board size should be enough to prevent managerial hegemony 
(Miller-Millesen, 2003).  Resource dependence theory advocates that a large board 
has the ability to link the organisation to the external environment and secure critical 
resources as well as being likely to provide the knowledge and skills needed 
(Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994).  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:172) noted ‘the 
greater the need for effective external linkage, the larger the board should be.’  If 
boards are trying to reduce external uncertainty, board members should have explicit 
abilities to reach their goals and the board size should be large enough to provide a 
wide diversity (Abzug, 1996; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999).  Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
asserted a large board size means the company has a better ability to understand and 
respond to diverse stakeholders.  They also argued that a large board size could 
reduce the possibility of the CEO’s control of the board and provide more talent to 
lead the organisation.   Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, (1985) and Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) have empirically demonstrated that firms with a good financial performance 
have a larger board size (10-15 board members) than failing firms.   
 
However, Herman (1981) and Goodstein et al., (1994) contend that large boards are 
weak boards as in-depth discussion becomes unlikely; diversity, contention, 
fragmentation and factions make it harder for the board members to work as a group 
and reach an agreement.  Large boards may also be less participative, less cohesive 
and less likely to reach an agreement.  Difficulties in communication and inhibition of 
the strategic action might exist which in turn limits the board members’ contributions 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Goodstein et al., 
1994).  Jensen (1993) suggested that a small board can help organisations improve 
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performance.  Empirical studies have also shown that small boards can help firms 
gain better financial performance (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999; Yermack, 1996).  
 
It is apparent that empirical studies on board size have inconsistent findings.  Most 
researchers have found that the board sizes are larger in nonprofit organisations 
(Callen, Klein, & Tinkelman, 2003; Cornforth & Simpson, 2003; Provan, 1980; 
Unterman & Davis, 1982) with sometimes as many as 30 members (National Center 
for Nonprofit Boards, 1996; Oster, 1995).  With a large board, nonprofit organisations 
can have better ability to access external resources and can satisfy the desire of the 
volunteers’ involvement.  Some nonprofit researchers had also tried to determine if 
there is a linkage between board size and board performance.  Olson (2000) found 
that there is a positive relationship between board size and donations.  However, in 
other research Miller, Weiss, and MacLeod (1988) and Bradshaw, Murray and 
Wolpin (1992) discovered that the board size was not related to board performance.  
 
In summary, the question of board size remains controversial.  However, there is a 
relative consensus that nonprofit organisations have a larger board than profit 
organisations whose survival is mainly dependent on external resources, such as 
donations or government subsidies.  When an organisation needs external resources to 
survive, it tries to recruit as many board members as possible to secure external 
resources and to create an extensive networking (Brown & Iverson, 2004; Miller-
Millesen, 2003; Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2000).  Little research is 
conducted to examine the issue of board size in sport organisations.  However, it is 
reasonable to anticipate that profit sport organisations will have a larger board size 
than nonprofit sport organisations. 
    
Board Independence 
Board independence has been primarily explored using agency theory.  Agency theory 
argues that to effectively monitor the CEO/manager, organisations should have a 
monitor mechanism in place that can oversee and control CEOs/managers and protect 
the stakeholders.  In turn, organisations will have a better performance (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Rhoades et al., 2000).  An independent 
board or board with outside members is widely considered an appropriate mechanism 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Agency theorists suggest that a dependent board or a board 
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with insiders, such as current or former managers/employees of the organisation, or 
those who are dependents of the organisations, is less likely to monitor the CEO and 
the independent board is more vigilant to oversee CEOs/managers (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Establishing a board with mostly 
external members is useful to connect with multiple stakeholders and can include 
voices and understanding from various stakeholders. 
 
There is almost uniform agreement in the literature that an effective board is 
independent (Dalton et al., 1998).  Jensen (1993) noted that CEOs/managers can be 
board members because they generally have intimate knowledge of the organisation 
and their knowledge can help the board make appropriate decisions.  Links between 
board independence and financial performance have been inconclusive, finding the 
relationship positive (Dalton et al., 1998; Rhoades et al., 2000; Zahra & Pearce 1989), 
negative (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Kesner, 1987; Pearce, 
1983), and not related (Bhagat & Black, 1999; Chaganti et al., 1985; Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Johnson, Ellstrand, & Daily, 1996; 
Kesner, 1987).  In summary, board independence is regarded as a mechanism of 
organisations to monitor CEOs/managers.  When this mechanism is effectively in 
place, CEOs/managers would act in the interests of stakeholders and in turn benefit 
organisational performance.  In sport governance, we know little about the issue about 
how organizational effectiveness and success relates to board independence.   
 
Governance structures in Taiwanese sport organisations  
The unitary board is the most common structure found across western countries. The 
unitary board of directors is characterized by one single board and it is responsible for 
all aspects of the organisation’s activities and all board members are working to 
achieve the same goal (Mallin, 2004). Sport organisations in Australia, United 
Kingdom and United States are organized by a unitary board structure. However, 
according to Taiwan’s Corporate Law (section 216-227), corporate boards in Taiwan 
are divided into two groups—a board of directors and a board of supervisors. This is a 




In Taiwan, the legal base for a profit sport organisation established as a company 
limited by shared is the Corporate Law. According to Taiwan’s Corporate Law, 
corporate boards in Taiwan, similar to Germany and Japanese boards, are divided into 
two groups—a board of directors and a board of supervisors (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). 
The Taiwan’s Corporate Law (section 192-215) stipulates that the directors are 
elected by a general meeting of shareholders. The minimum number of directors is 
three. The chairman is elected by board members and the CEOs/managers are 
nominated by the chairman or board. Therefore, the CEO is responsible for the 
chairman of the board, the chairman is responsible for the board and the board is 
responsible for the shareholder meetings. Moreover, Taiwan’s Corporate Law (section 
216-227) stipulates that companies limited by shares should have a board of 
supervisors. Supervisors are elected by the general meeting of shareholders and the 
minimum number of supervisors is two. Current employees, boards of directors and 
managers are forbidden from serving as supervisors.  
 
Nonprofit sport organisations, in Taiwan, are asked to register as a “judicial person” 
under related supervising government bodies, such as the Ministry of the Interior. The 
Civil Code (section 25-58) is the legal base for Taiwan’s nonprofit sport organisations. 
It stipulates basic requirements as to governance, establishment, and operation of 
nonprofit organisations. The Civil Organisation Law serves as a role in 
complementing the Civil Code. The Civil Organisation Law articulates the application 
procedure. Thirty founding members are required when starting a new nonprofit sport 
organisation. This is followed by a formal review and approval process by the 
government. National associations apply to the Ministry of Interior and local 
associations apply to municipal or county government (Lu, 2000). The Civil 
Organisation Law requires the nonprofit sport organisations to set up the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors. The maximum number of the board of 
directors of civil organisations at the national level is thirty-five. The maximum 
number of civil organisations at the province and county levels is twenty-five and 
fifteen respectively. The maximum number of the board of supervisors is one-third of 
the number of the board of directors of the civil organisations at any level. The Civil 
Code and the Civil Organisation Law do not stipulate the roles of the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors but request nonprofit sport organisations to 
regulate these roles.  
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According to the Minister of the Interior of Taiwan (2005), before 1987, the number 
of national-level nonprofit sport organisations was 54 and there were not any local-
level nonprofit sports organisation. In 1991, there were 118 and 653 nonprofit sport 
organisations respectively in the national and local levels. These numbers have been 
continually increasing. In 1995 and 2000, the number of nonprofit sport organisations 
at the national level was 197 and 402; at the local level, the number was 922 and 
1,509. In 2005, the number increased to 624 in the national level and to 2,378 in the 
local level.  
 
Governance research is a relatively new area of investigation in Taiwan. Much 
attention so far has been placed on corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 2005; Lee 
& Yeh, 2004; Solomon et al., 2003; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). Solomon et al. (2003) 
investigated the board of directors in Taiwan’s listed companies. Their results showed 
that most directors acknowledged that their roles are important to their companies. 
Respondents also indicated that the board size and outside directors can influence 
company performance. Accordingly, the development of the nonprofit sector in 
Taiwan spans fewer than 20 years. It is not surprising that research in this setting is 
sparse. Indeed, the research effort was not on nonprofit organisations in Taiwan until 
the mid-1990s (Hsiao, 2000). The empirical study of governance of nonprofit 
organisations has just emerged in recent years (Kuan, 1998, , 2003; Kuan et al., 2003; 
Tseng, 2002). Kuan (1998) examined nonprofit social welfare foundations in Taiwan. 
He found that many board members are passive in their organisations. Most members 
only ratify decision made by executives and their supervisory role is very weak. 
Tseng (2002) surveyed 571 nonprofit organisations regardless of their fields. His 
findings showed that 70 percent of the board members were male; the majority of 
board members graduated from higher education institution and many had business 
background. 20 percent of the boards played a role as councilors that decided on 
annual activities and budgets. In strategic activities, 40 percent of nonprofit 
organisations have built cooperative relations with other organisations for securing 
resources. Academic institutions were the most popular resource partners. Tseng 
called for in-depth research to clearly define what the roles of nonprofit boards are 
and to better understand the nonprofit sector.  
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In summary, there is growing research into governance of Taiwanese organisations. 
However, this effort has been largely located within corporate governance in the 
commercial industry. Few studies have been carried out in the sport setting and the 
nonprofit sport organisations have yet to be a focus. The growth of Taiwan’s 
nonprofit sport organisations occurred at a rapid speed. This swift growth does not 
mean there is appropriate governance in place. Without empirically examining the 
governance of nonprofit sport organisations, the government and the public have no 
way to assess the information of their internal management. No one can guarantee that 
they have self-discipline without external stakeholders’ examination. Moreover, 
research has not examined issues as to the dual board structure of Taiwan’ profit and 
nonprofit organisations. Investigations of governance of Taiwan’s nonprofit sport 
organisations will be breaking new ground. 
 
Conclusion 
Governance is a critical component of managing sport organisations, how to best 
monitor organisational activities, deliver benefits to organisations and guide an 
organisation is critical to organisational sustainability.  The board plays a significant 
role in a governance system because decisions made by the board can affect the entire 
organisation. The literature review presented here has suggested that we can draw on 
existing theories to understand how boards work and to use this information to design 
appropriate board structures for sport organisations. Empirical studies should be 
conducted to examine board composition in sport organisations, such as board size 
and board independences.   
 
Future research is needed to explore the differences in board roles and board 
composition between profit and nonprofit sport organisations, between national and 
local sport organisations, between professional and amateur sport organisations, and 
between Western and Non-Western sport organisations.  It has been argued here that 
sport organisations are in a dynamic and competitive environment (Amis, Slack, & 
Hinings, 2004a).  Comparing the differences in board governance within sport sector 
can help sport organisations understand themselves and their rival organisations and 
in turn stand out in a competitive environment.  According to an ancient Chinese 
military treatise, titled the Art of War written during the 6th century BC by Sun Tzu, 
if you know both yourself and your enemy, you will come out of one hundred battles 
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with one hundred victories (Tan, 2001).  Moreover, examining differences in board 
governance between sport and non-sport sectors can not only help us clarify 
differences between sport sector and non-sport sectors but also help researchers 
develop a framework or a theory for sport governance.  
 
 
